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Abstract 
Cyber Security will always be a subject of discussion for a long time to come. Research 
has shown that there is massive growth of cyber-crime and the currently available 
number of Cyber Security experts to counter this is limited. Although there are multiple 
resources discussing Cyber Security, but access to training in practical applications is 
limited. As an institution, Eastern Illinois University (EIU) is set to start Masters of 
Science in Cyber Security in Fall 20 1 7. Then the challenge is how EIU will expose 
students to the practical reality of Cyber Security where they can learn different 
detection, prevention and incidence analysis techniques of cyber-attacks. In addition, 
students should have the opportunity to learn cyber-attacks legally. This research 
proposes a solution for these needs by focusing on the design of firewall architecture with 
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) for the EIU 
Cyber Security Laboratory. This thesis explores different up to date techniques and 
methods for detection and prevention of cyber-attacks. The overall outcome of this 
research is to design a public testing site that invites hackers to attack for the purpose of 
detection, prevention and security incidence analysis. This public firewall might 
empower students and instructors with practical cyber-attacks, detection techniques, 
prevention techniques, and forensics analysis tools. It may also provide the knowledge 
required for further research in the field of Cyber Security. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 Introduction 
The increasing nature of cyber-attacks is very worrisome and poses a major threat to both 
economic and social development. Between the year 2008 and 20 1 3, the number of cyber 
threats increased from 2 .37  million to 5 .2 million. Also, there is an increase of over 
1 00,000 new malicious programs daily from the 200,000 daily reported in 201 2 [ 1 ] .  As 
reported by Net Losses : [2], cyber-attacks will continue to grow as more businesses go 
online and as we gravitate towards "Internet of Things". In addition, cyber-attacks have 
equally grown to become more sophisticated in nature. 
The sophisticated nature of cyber-attacks on computer networks these days has rendered 
traditional firewalls inefficient; even the most complex ones are insufficient in protecting 
attacks from penetrating computer networks [3 ] .  As a result, there is a need for better and 
more effective solutions for detecting and preventing attacks. The subject of Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) has drawn the attention 
of both the academic and corporate world. An IDS is mainly a defensive mechanism that 
gives alerts, and log the information when it detects an attack or any malicious activity in 
a passive system, while in a reactive mode, the IDS can log off the malicious user or 
issue a command for the firewall to reconfigure itself to block such traffic from malicious 
user [4] . 
However, taking a step further, a more proactive approach is needed which not only 
detect but can also prevent the attacks from invading the computer networks. Such a 
device is referred as an IPS, and according to Conklin and White [5],  "IPSs are merely 
1 
expansions of existing IDS capabilities" .  They argued that a true IPS must be able to 
block, reject or redirect traffic in real time. An IDS that monitors a single host system is a 
Host Intrusion detection Systems (HIDS) while IDS that monitors an entire network is a 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) [ 42] . In this research, IDS is 
conceptualized as an NIDS. 
The detection, sensor monitoring, and alert mechanism techniques of an IDS help also the 
IPS to discover new patterns of attack or malicious behavior. The IDS evolution allows 
both the IPS and IDS to share what they have learned with other connected networks or 
systems, thus increasing its effectiveness against attacks [6] [7] . They also prevent 
malicious activities from bringing damage to the network [8 ] .  Hence, the deployment of 
modem IDS and IPS in a network offers an advantage of dual intrusion detection and 
prevention. The IPS/IDS combination provides the best security architecture for an in­
depth defense [9] . 
Some literatures refer to the combination of IDS and IPS as Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System (IDPS). Korcak et al [ 1 0] research on IDS/IPS for a WIFI networks 
environment shows that there was about 95% decrease in the number of attacks compared 
to a network without the deployment of their proposed IDPS solution. Therefore, it may 
be concluded that the security been provided by an IDS/IPS security system could be a 
discouraging factor for some hackers to launch attacks, and most hackers would rather 
launch attacks against most vulnerable networks. 
1.1 Justification of the Study 
Kelvin G. Coleman [ 1 1 ]  reported that Casteel the manager of SCAD A and security 
2 
business development at Emerson Process Management said: "we would never be able to 
completely get ahead of cyber criminals perpetuating cyber-attacks". If hackers would 
not rest, then it is very reasonable that researchers continue to research, design and 
implement security techniques to equip people on combating security attacks. Also 
according to McGettrick [ 1 2] ,  the continuing expansion of technology invariably leads to 
continuing growth of cyber-attacks, which also calls for the need for more skilled people 
to combat this menace. The available pool of people with strong cyber security skill sets 
is quite low, thereby resulting in difficulties as private sectors and government agencies 
such as United States Department of National Defense and Department of Homeland 
Security jostle to engage competent individuals to fight cyber-crime [ 1 2] .  
Educational institutions, especially the universities, should be the ones providing 
leadership when it comes to combatting cyber-attacks. In designing Cyber Security 
curriculum, both theoretical and practical knowledge are essential to produce individuals 
that are able to understand the nitty gritty of cyber-attacks and how they should be 
prevented, hence, able to sufficiently get above the hackers game but quite often, the 
academic environment separates these two from another [ 1 2] .  In the area of fighting 
cyber-attacks, theories are good as they provide the basic underlying principles; however, 
these are usually not sufficient for employment. Providing laboratory training would 
further reinforce and expose students to several technologies used by most organizations 
[ 1 3 ] .  
It is possible that many industries have been disappointed with the practical experience of 
students graduating in this field, hence, the reason they demand extra qualifications in the 
name of certifications during employment process [ 1 4] .  In addition, according to the 
3 
Change the Equation (CTEq), a methodology that aims at improving the quality of STEM 
program in the United States, there are shortages of STEM talent. The reason is that 
fewer people are pursuing degrees in the areas of Cyber Security, computer science and 
IT related courses, and these degrees rarely encompass recent Cyber Security contents 
[ 1 4] [ 1 5] .  
1.2 Overall aim 
This study will propose a solution for the new Master of Science program in Cyber 
Security at EIU: To provide students with practical cyber-attacks detection, prevention 
and incidence analyzes experience and skills that will bridge the gap between academic 
education and practical training. 
1.3 Objectives 
1 .  To design a firewall architecture with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and 
Intrusion Prevent System (IPS) for the Cyber Security Laboratory at EIU. 
2 .  To use the developed firewall architecture as a public testing site by inviting 
hackers to attack the system in other to analyze hacking activities. 
3 .  To provide the prospective MSc Cyber Security students at EIU the practical 
realities of cyber-attacks, threats analysis, detections and preventions in other to 
bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical training. 
1.4 Hypotheses 
The intent of this research is to ascertain the following: 
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It is possible to: 
1 .  Develop firewall architecture with an IDS/JPS that would offer a high resiliency 
to cyber-attacks within the academic setting of the EIU telecommunication' s 
laboratory. 
2 .  Provide students with real cyber-attacks experiences in  order to empower them to 
research and to improve Cyber Security systems based on the EIU Cyber Security 
laboratory experience. 
3 .  Operate a physical Cyber Security laboratory with intrusion detection and 
intrusion prevention capabilities that attract prospective students to the MSc. 
program and in turn give EIU recognition among schools offering Cyber Security 
programs. 
1.5 Delimitation 
This research would strictly provide a firewall architecture design with an IDS/JPS for 
the purpose of intrusion detection, prevention and security incidence analysis, and would 
not discuss the speed or the full implementation of the designed system. The 
implementation of a honeypot is out of the scope of this research work. In addition, this 
research will not focus on detecting or preventing internal attacks. This research design 
would serve as a public testing site that invites outside hackers to launch attacks. It is 
possible that hackers launch sophisticated attacks that can break the security of designed 
system. However, it is also very possible that we catch/log all the activities that these 
hackers did to break the system, which is ultimately one of the goals of this research 
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2.0 Literature Review 
CHAPTER TWO 
This chapter provides background information and a theoretical justification for the 
firewall architecture with an IDS/IPS for the MSc. Cyber Security at EIU. 
2.1 Cyber Security and its Challenges 
Fisher [ 1 6] defines Cyber Security as a way of protecting and securing information and 
communication technology systems. The advent of information communication 
technology and its growth has continuously raised concern for data privacy protection, 
authorized information sharing and data integrity [ 1 6] .  According to Baylon [ 1 7], the 
cyberspace users have tremendously increased and this has incidentally resulted in its 
continuous expansion, which has had a consequential reduction in the cost of Internet 
access. Baylon [ 1 7] argued further that cyber criminals have taken advantage of this 
growth to create cheap software which basically requires no technical know-how for 
whoever, to be able to launch cyber-attacks. Based on these arguments, one can conclude 
that cyber-attacks might not be on the decline anytime soon. In addition, the heavy 
dependent on technology and the Internet for the continuous sustenance of businesses, 
government, and individual needs has opened up new vulnerabilities and opportunities 
for hackers to further their criminal acts [ 1 8] .  
The growing nature of the electronic world is characterized by different networks and 
interconnected devices, the need to store and interact with a huge amount of data 
especially via an online platform and the cloud has resulted into the complex nature of 
the computer networks [ 1 8] .  As a result of this complexity characterized by physical, 
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logical and social layers, managing Cyber Security has been difficult as vulnerabilities 
are not easily detected, and attackers are able to exploit these vulnerabilities to launch 
attacks in an invisible manner [ 1 9] [20] . In recent times, the Internet of Things (IoT) has 
been one of the major subjects in the IT world. With the reality of loT, we can expect 
more complexity, as more devices would be interconnected. Folk et al [20] put the 
number of these devices at over 50 billion, and with this comes unimaginable exploits, 
vulnerabilities, and attacks. In a research conducted by the office of the privacy 
commissioner of Canada [ 1 8],  by the year 20 1 7, the total number of operational mobile 
devices would outnumber the population of the world. This fact supports the above 
security concerns. According to a research conducted by Check Point software 
Technologies Limited, there is a growing security concern with mobile devices [2 1 ] .  The 
report shows that there was 63% increase in security risks of Android mobile platform 
[2 1 ] .  
The Cyb er Security war will b e  difficult to defeat, as even the custodians of the law have 
found it to be a weapon to achieve illegal gains. This is evident as some states often times 
engage the services of hackers in order to accomplish evil agendas [22] . It is very 
alarming to see different countries using sophisticated malware, spear phishing and denial 
distributed of service against one another [23 ] .  I perceive this as some sort of cyber war 
or cyber terrorism, which definitely would be deadlier than terrorism. In 20 1 1 , the 
pentagon noted that any act of attack or sabotage arriving from another country is a 
possible act of war [24] . Miller [25] described this as the militarization of cyber-attacks 
using highly trained hackers to access critical resources and information. In addition, the 
organized nature of cyber-crime has made the fight against cyber-crime difficult. 
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According to a review in 20 1 2, organized hacking constituted 80% of cyber-crime 
activities [22] . In 20 1 4, a first of its kind, a massive and sophisticated attack was 
launched against Sony. This level of attack reflects the highly and strategical 
organizational structure of an organized attack attributed to the Korean government 
[23 ] [24] . Theophany [24] referred to this nature of attack as information warfare, that is, 
one that involves countries, government and big corporations in a bit to disrupt national 
security. Ferrillo [25] pointed to a recent release by FBI stating that China alone 
accounted for 95% of data breaches coming from foreign countries. 
Top 10 Data Breaches in the U.S. 
"Total Number of Records &posed 
1 
eBay Inc. (May 2014) 
Target Corporation !November lOll) 
JPMorgan Chase & CO. (August 2014) 
United States Department of \leteram Affalri (January 2009} 
Epsilon Data Management LLC (Aprill 20ll) 
Figure 2 . 1 : Showing the Top 1 0  Data Breaches in the U.S 
Taking a critical look at data and figures resulting from successful cyber-attacks and data 
breaches, one can easily conclude that fighting cyber-attack would require huge financial 
budgeting and continuous spending. In Figure 2 . 1 above, as reported by Ferrillo [25], one 
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can conclude that big corporations and companies would continually experience attacks. 
The 20 1 5  information security breaches survey carried out by PWC in conjunction with 
info security, shows that 90% of large organizations representing about 1 1  % from the 
previous year's breaches and about 74% of small businesses representing about 23% 
increase from the previous year's breaches were victims of cyber-attacks [26] . The 
significance of this is very symbolic, meaning that if these breaches continue at this rate, 
businesses would continue to incur heavy cost and reputation damages. In 20 1 4  alone, 
large organizations lost to security breaches summed up to an average range between 
$2.05 million to $4.5 million [26] . In a world development report, Bauer & Dutton 
reported the global cost implication of cyber-crime to be at $445 billion [27] . 
2.2 Major Cyber Attacks 
Hackers have developed several mechanisms ranging from simple to sophisticated 
techniques to perpetuating their criminal acts. In addition, the majority of them, leverage 
on the loopholes found in some of the hardware and software components of the 
interconnected network systems. Jun et al [23 ] noted that the biggest and the most 
commonly exploited platform for Cyber Security breaches is the point-of-sale (POS). Jun 
et al [23 ] also stressed that POS are basically attacked by gaining access to the credit card 
processing system of a retailer and installing several variants of malware on it, which 
usually goes unnoticed for a longer period of time. Malware's invisible capabilities make 
them unsuspicious spies on computer and network resources [28 ] .  This malware does 
manifest as viruses, worms, spyware, adware, Trojan, and bots. Miller [29] described 
another form of attack called advanced persistent threats that has been around for long 
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but have gained more attention due to the consistent changing sophisticated nature of 
cyber-attacks and the fast changing nature of the threat actors behind these attacks.  
In the Fortinet white paper titled "anatomy of botnets", the author identified distributed 
denial of service, spamming, financial fraud, search engine optimization poisoning, pay­
per-click, cooperate and industrial espionage and bitcoin mining as several techniques 
hackers deploy in using botnets to generate money [30] . After a successful installation, 
the working operation of a botnet is such that it creates a backdoor, an avenue it use� to 
communicate or transfer stolen sensitive information and other details used to identify the 
infected system to its master [30] . Kamal et al [28] stressed that bots are the greatest 
threats and risks to users, computers and networks in recent times, because of their highly 
destructive nature. According to a white paper by McAfee, malware can exhibit 
polymorphism characteristics when hackers designed them to exist in a different form via 
regular updates, thereby making it difficult to be detected by signature updates techniques 
[3 1 ] .  
SQL injection attacks on web applications operated by retail stores are quite popular 
owing to the sensitive information in their database [25 ] .  Different services like the 
emails, e-commerce, social media, television media that majorly use these applications to 
service their teeming clients are the major target of SQL injection attacks. SQL injection 
attack, if successful, can make an attacker bypass authentication, evade detection, 
perform data modification and extraction amongst other things, and these explain why 
they are very popular [32] . It has grown and become one of the key attack mechanisms of 
hackers, that the Open Web Application Security Project (OW ASP) rated it number one 
web application vulnerability in 20 1 3  [33 ] .  
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Another dreaded attack is the zero day attack. A zero-day attack is an exploitation of 
vulnerability also referred to as a hole in software [25 ] .  This form of attack is deadly 
because there is no way to protect or defend against this nature of attack [34] . In 20 1 0, 
windows operating system, Adobe reader, and Adobe Flash Player were major vulnerable 
victims of the 1 4-day zero attack that made the high-profile attack using Stuxnet worm 
and Hydraq Trojan to be successful [34] . Egelman et al [35]  focused on explaining the 
new security paradigm of zero-day exploits markets and raises an argument for and 
against this new paradigm shift. They concluded that these markets have gained so much 
popularity and attention and thus have consequential implications on the software 
manufacturing companies. 
Hedge [36] identified Mac (MAC) spoofing as one of the major causes of denial of 
service attacks (DoS), man in the middle attack, dynamic name service (DNS) attack and 
address resolution protocol (ARP) poisoning. Man in the middle attack gives listening 
functionality to an intruder and allows such an intruder to listen to every communication 
traversing the network. DoS take advantage of the weaknesses of the IP protocol stack to 
disrupt the flow of traffic or services in a network [37] . Farraposo [37] categorizes DoS 
attack into normal DoS attack if attacks originate from a single computer system and 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) if attacks originate from multiple computer systems. 
A DNS attack can be launched indirectly or directly, an indirect attack is launched by 
registering a domain name deliberately for the purpose of stealing victim's identity and 
redirecting traffic [38] ,  while a direct attack executes against DNS infrastructure using 
DoS, DDoS, and DNS cache poisoning, the later redirects legitimate traffic to hackers ' 
websites [38] . Gangan [39] mentioned that ARP cache poisoning and session hijacking 
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are causes of man in the middle attacks. Hackers use different tools such as Cain and 
able, Ettercap, Dsniff, etc to update an ARP cache table in order to redirect ARP 
responses to themselves and then be able to extract the necessary information that is 
needed to further perpetuate crime [39] . Session hijacking attacks an application layer by 
taking control of the HTTP session to obtain information about session ID and at the 
network layer of the OSI model by intercepting communication between the client and 
the server, leveraging on the unawareness and non-security consciousness of users [ 40] . 
2.3 Different Techniques to Fight Cyber Attacks 
There are several techniques or technologies that are always been deployed by the 
government, cooperate bodies and individuals in order to fight cyber-attacks and keep 
their network and resources save. A brief review of some of these technologies is given 
below. 
2.3.1 Firewall Technologies 
Tharaka et al [ 4 1 ]  pointed out that a firewall does not necessary have the capability to 
handle or process malicious traffic but a combination of different firewall technologies 
may prove quite successful. They lamented the limited research activities on the subject 
of firewall technologies. A firewall filters packets separating the authentic ones from the 
malicious ones and then blocking the malicious ones. Tharaka et al [ 4 1 ]  explore the 
combination of Network Address Translation (NAT), Virtual Private Network (VPN) and 
the packet filtering functionality of a firewall to propose a defense against cyber-attacks. 
NAT allows addresses to translate to another different address entirely. An example, 
private IP addresses translate to public IP addresses. This concept helps to hide private IP 
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addresses from the public. It could be a one-to-one NAT or a dynamic NAT, where 
multiple IP addresses translate to a single IP address. In addition, the VPN is a very good 
secure point of communication, as it builds a tunnel, as a channel of communication and 
encrypting the traffic traveling through it using the most common form of encryption 
protocol like IP sec [ 42] . The firewall also provides the concept of security zones, where 
different resources could be placed on different zones based on how important they are, 
usually, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) houses the public webserver, while the very 
important company's information are kept in the trusted zone, and the access to the public 
network is kept in the untrusted zone [ 42] . 
Despite the security capability of firewalls, events, antecedents and research have proven 
that they would not be capable of solving all security issues and they might not be able to 
stop the new breed of sophisticated attacks. In lieu of this, Chopra [43] proposes the 
concept of distributed firewall architecture in order to mitigate sophisticated attacks. 
Chopra' s research concluded on the note that distributed firewall techniques would create 
endpoint protection and at the same time enforce domain security using language and 
distribution policy control in conjunction with certificates for identity management of the 
domain members [ 43 ] .  A report by Rajeswari [ 44] states that firewalls ability to serve as 
the first line of defense on a local area network (LAN) against attacks are limited to being 
able to watch or detect any malicious traffic coming from a Wi-Fi enabled device that is 
behind the LAN. The reason given for this is that firewalls would usually perform reverse 
tunneling, a process that allows devices to make outbound connections through a firewall. 
Conklin et al [ 42] defined a perfect firewall as one that would not allow the passage of 
malicious or unauthorized packet. In the real world of security, I doubt if we would ever 
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have a perfect firewall that is not susceptible to compromise. Although to a large extent, 
with constant monitoring of the firewall and proper configuration of security policies, 
firewalls could perform at their best. Firewalls do not perform filtering or check on traffic 
by default, they follow some sort of security policies configured by a network or systems 
administrator. Firewalls perform the function of traffic filtering following security 
policies configured by network administrators, how well these firewalls perform filtering 
is dependent on how well the security policies are configured [ 42] . 
2.3.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
The awareness about the difficulty in achieving a perfect security of network resources 
must have given birth to the idea of detecting network intrusions either before attacks 
take place or after it has taken place. Patil et al [ 45] described an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) as a system or mechanism that identifies malicious packets or traffic that 
are both known and unknown. Conklin et al [ 42] define an IDS as a system that triggers 
an alarm when it sees an anomaly. In reality, triggering an alarm might not necessarily be 
indicative of a threat or attack. The administrator could further tune the IDS to reduce the 
rate of false alarms. Patil et al [ 45] in their research were able to show a reduction of 
about 1 0 .02% in the false alarm rate of an IDS that uses clustering and classification 
hybrid techniques. Conklin et al [ 42] described in detail the workings of an IDS, the IDS 
uses traffic collectors to acquire traffic or packets and send them it to the analysis engine 
which inspects the traffic to see if there are known patterns of malicious traffic when 
compared to the traffic signatures that are in its database, and it finally passes the 
outcome to the user interface and report it appropriately. 
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In their work, Cepheli et al [ 46] proposed a hybrid intrusion detection framework to 
combat distributed denial of service attack (DDoS).  They leveraged on both the anomaly 
and signature detection capability of an IDS to enhance the effectiveness of detection of 
DDoS attack. Das and Sarkar [47] gave a clear distinction between a firewall and an 
NIDS as many often regard them to be the same. They stated that firewall basically just 
stands as a guard that control traffic base on rule sets while NIDS is able to detect what is 
going on the inside of a network. Although they were quick to also point out that NIDS is 
not able to scan encrypted network traffic just in the same way a firewall could not as 
well [46] . Besides being able to identify and detect DDoS, Conklin et al [42] said the 
NIDS is capable of detecting other attacks such as port scans or sweeps, the presence of 
malicious content on data payload, Trojans, viruses, worms, tunneling, and brute-force. 
In another research conducted by Alkasassbeh et al [ 48] ,  they incorporated different 
techniques such as multilayer perceptron (MLP), Naive Bayes and Random Forest to 
improve the detection capability of an IDS, and they concluded that implementing the 
MLP delivered 98 .63% detection accuracy. 
The changing nature of attacks spurs researchers to constantly research techniques that 
can keep up with this development. Bini et al [ 49] described such techniques, namely; (i) 
"Data mining & forensics" :  an advantage of information in a repository or database to 
analyze attacks. (ii) "Intelligent agent and mining" : intelligently learn new signature to 
detect attacks, a technique they claim reduces false positive and false negative, (iii) 
"Genetic algorithm" :  working is based on heuristic search method and (iv) "Fuzzy logic 
based alert optimization engine" : an alert re-scoring technique that leads to a further 
reduction in the number alerts. They concluded that combining all of these techniques 
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would result in more effective IDS . Another key thing to be considered is the placement 
of an IDS in a network. As shown in Fig 2 .2 below, Conklin et al [ 42] described that 
placing an IDS before a firewall would make it see every traffic coming through the 
firewall and as such would report every alarm generated by itself and the firewall, hence 
overwhelming the administrator of such network with a huge number of alarms. 
lnt:emt't 
NIDS 
Figure 2 .2 :  NIDS sensor placed before the firewall 
C«porate 
networic 
Another option is shown in Figure 2 .3  below, Conklin et al [ 42] explained that placing 
the IDS behind the firewall would reduce the huge alarm effect created in Figure 2.2 
because it prevents the IDS from seeing attacks coming directly towards the firewall. 
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NIDS 
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Figure 2 .3 : NIDS sensor placed behind the firewall 
2.3.3 Intrusion Prevention System (JPS) 
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netWOfX 
A modem intrusion prevention system could perform both functions of detecting and 
preventing malicious traffic as traffic traverses on a network, thereby making it an 
intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) [47]. The different challenges such as 
speed, performance, scalability, flexibility and inability to proactively prevent malicious 
contents led to the development of such modem IPS [ 4 7] [ 50]. An IPS is most effective 
when it can inspect protocols and analyze them. As an example, it might perform HTTP 
protocol inspection in order to be able to detect and prevent the popular URL encoding 
evasion technique [ 42]. Unlike the IDS,  the IPS can perform a content inspection on 
traffic with the TLS protocol encryption, decrypt such traffic and take a decision on 
whether to allow it or not [42]. According to Korcak [ 1 0] ,  an IDPS deployed to mitigate 
against DoS and ICMP flood attacks proved to be effective as it reduces traffic 
originating from an attacker by 95%. This shows the potential of an IPS system. 
17 
Kaur & Dhingra [5 1 ]  proposed an algorithm for an IDPS in preventing SQL injection 
attacks against a database system by checking all database transactions before they are 
finally committed in order to prevent malicious transactions from being committed. In 
another research work, Ammad & Laiq [52] proposed a real-time IDPS that uses the Kali 
Linux operating system, an NIDS, and an IPS that blocks malicious traffic detected by 
the NIDS . This technique definitely offers a double detection advantage because the IPS 
also have the capability to detect before it prevents .  This is a good way to affirm the 
integrity and accuracy of the NIDS and IPS that make up their design. Also critical to the 
success of an IPS is the ability to place an IPS inline in order for all traffic to flow 
through it and its ability to detect and stop against DoS attacks using rate-based 
monitoring even while being in the inline operation mode [ 42]. Intrusion prevention 
seems to be the way to go in safeguarding network resources. Holland & Shey in their 
publication forecasted that there would be 5% to 1 0% increase in intrusion prevention 
systems [53 ] .  Although they pointed out that this prevention should not be limited to 
prevention techniques that are only signature based, but also endpoint protection and 
identity management technology that can identify even a hacker's infrastructure while 
offering protection. 
2.4 The Need for Cybersecurity Knowledge 
Despite the constantly developed techniques to combat the menace of cyber-attacks, there 
seems to be a gap in knowledge or the expertise required to complement these 
technologies. Most of these technologies still need human Cyber Security experts to 
configure and monitor these devices for optimal performance. According to a report by 
the Institute for Information Security & Privacy (IISP), there is a shortage of about one 
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million information security specialists, and the worrisome thing about this is that the 
current trend does not guarantee that this problem would receive an immediate solution 
[54]. The report further stated that by 2020, there would be a shortage of 1 . 5 million 
workers with Cyber Security knowledge or expertise [54]. This is very alarming, and it 
raises a very serious concern. If winning the cyber war is necessary, then sophisticated 
technology to fight Cyber Security attacks and challenges, must continue to grow, as well 
as the number of Cyber Security experts. The same report says that there is no extensive 
class time in Cyber Security topics. Although in a separate report, Baeur & Dutton [27] 
reported that there has been an effort in some Northern American and Western European 
science departments to increase cyber learning and yet this is not enough to meet the 
global need. 
The gap in knowledge or the required expertise in the field of Cyber Security forms the 
basis for this research work. A report by ACM stressed that Cyber Security as a discipline 
is lacking the necessary skills [55]. In the same report, a recommendation was made that 
Cyber Security at master's level should receive encouragement to attract prospective 
students to the field, and encourage professors to take an interest in embarking on Cyber 
Security projects . There should be aggressive Cyber Security research laboratories all 
over the world in order to keep up-to-date with current Cyber Security challenges and 
attacks. In reality, we probably do not need every graduate in technology or computer 
engineering to become Cyber Security experts, but we do need an appreciable number of 
graduates with such knowledge. This research aims to design an IDS/IPS system within 
firewall architecture in order to serve as a learning platform for students enrolling for the 
masters in Cyber Security program at EIU. This research work would have its webserver 
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public IP address exposed to the public, and hence, it will be able to receive real attacks 
from external networks, hence student might learn with real and simulated cyber-attacks 
rather than only simulated laboratory created attacks. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 Design Methodology 
This chapter describes details of the methodologies and techniques deployed in order to 
achieve the objectives of this research. 
3.1  The Topology of  the Design 
Figure 3 . 1  below depicts the design, which is reflective of a layered security approach 
characterized by different security devices with the sole aim of creating a strong defense 
in depth mechanism [ 42]. Security should be developed with the total awareness of the 
consequences of a single point of failure. Conklin et al [ 42] stressed that other security 
devices that form a whole security architecture could complement the inadequacies of a 
failed security device. Conklin et al [ 42] went further to advocate that network security 
systems or architecture should have the following techniques or methods: routers, 
firewalls, network segments which can also be referred to as perimeter security, IDSs, 
encryption, authentication software, physical security and traffic control to achieve 
layered security. According to Cleghorn [56], defense in depth would deter a casual 
attacker and a skilled hacker that lacks the continual motivation to perpetuate evil agenda 
as a result of several obstacles by different layers of security that needed to be overcome, 
and also prevent the invasion of automated attacks usually run by software programs 
targeted at public facing webservers . 
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Figure 3 . 1 : IDS/IPS design topology for EIU Cyber Security Laboratory 
3.2 The Router 
SERVER (Intranet 
website} 
In this research work, the Cisco router 1 94 1  W is used. The Cisco 1 94 1  W has the capacity 
to deliver secured data and great mobility. It comes with two integrated 1 0/ 1 00/ 1 000 
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Ethernet ports. In this topology, the cisco router provides the following functions : 
3.2. 1 The Cisco Router as a Boundary Router 
The final essence of this research is to connect the developed design to an external 
network or to Internet in order for traffic to flow to and fro the external networks. In 
order to fulfill this, a router is needed to process and route traffic into the designed 
network, and also to process and direct traffic to the outside when originated by an inside 
user. As shown in Figure 3 . 1  above, the Gigabit Ethernet interface 0/0 (GO/O) connects to 
an ISP that provides Internet service for the designed topology. This interface plugs into a 
Cisco Bridge that connects wirelessly to a Verizon wireless hotspot for the purpose of 
Internet access.  The Interface on the router is configured as a dynamic host configuration 
protocol client, which allows the router to automatically receive an IP address from the 
Verizon wireless through the Cisco Bridge connected to it. 
A network device would need a public IP address in order for it to be able to 
communicate with Internet. This means that Gigabit Ethernet interface 0/0 (GO/O) of the 
router needs a public IP address, but in this case, the Verizon hotspot assigned a private 
IP address to it in the range 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .0 subnet and through the process of network 
address translation (NAT), translates the private IP address to a public static IP address. 
NAT translate private IP addresses (non-routable) into public (routable) IP addresses and 
in doing that, it shields external network or external users from knowing the private IP 
addresses, thereby providing a form of security [ 42] . The NAT technique used by 
Verizon is referred to as port address translation (PAT) as it basically translates all the 
addresses in the 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .0 network into a single public IP address that would be used 
by any of the private IP addresses to get on the Internet. On the same router, the Gigabit 
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Ethernet interface O/ l (G0/ 1 )  is configured with a private IP address in the range 
50 .0 .0 .013 0 network. This interface connects directly to the Firewall/IDS .  
3.2.2 Port Forwarding to the Webserver 
The architecture of this design is such that a webserver is on the external DMZ of the 
network and would have a separate private IP address that is not known by the external 
users but has a public IP address representation. Users from the outside wanting to 
interact with this webserver would do so by sending traffic to the public webserver IP 
address. In order for the traffic sent to the webserver public address to hit the webserver 
on the inside of the network, the traffic would have to be in a format that the webserver 
would understand. Security is at the heart of the design hence, the webserver would only 
respond to a request or traffic coming from an IP address in its subnet range. In order for 
the traffic originating from the outside or Internet to communicate with the webserver, 
the following would have to take place : 
1 .  Internet traffic destined for the webserver will first go to the webserver' s public 
IP address .  
2 .  Then this traffic forwards to the router' s  GO/O interface.  This is possible with the 
concept of port forwarding, directing Internet originating traffic to GO/O . In Figure 
3 .2 the Verizon J etpack hotspot forwards traffic from Internet through port 80 to 
the IP address 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .2 ,  which is the IP address on GO/O of the router' s  
interface. 
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Figure 3 .2 :  Port Forwarding Configuration 
Since the purpose of this design is to allow students experience different real cyber-
attacks, Figure 3 . 3  shows how to allow traffic via a different range of ports. 
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Figure 3 . 3 :  Showing configuration to open many ports 
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3.2.3 NAT Configuration and Filtering on the Boundary Router 
The Gigabit Ethernet interface 0/ 1 (GOi l )  of the router is configured with the IP address 
in the subnet 50 .0 .0 .0/30 .  The G0/ 1 directly connects to the firewall/IDS .  In order for 
traffic directed to the GO/O interface of the router to go into the web server, the following 
configuration is required on the router: 
1 .  Network address translation is configured on the router for both interface GO/O 
and G0/1 of the router to direct traffic in and out respectively. The IP address 
1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .2 on the GO/O translates into the IP address 50 .0 .0 .2  of the firewall/IDS 
that connects directly to the router. 
2 .  The NAT inside command i s  configured o n  the GOil interface o f  the router while 
the NAT outside command is configured on the GO/O interface of the router. 
3.2.4 Access List Configuration to Prevent IP Spoofing 
An attacker can pretend to be part of an internal network by trying to use an inside 
private IP address to communicate with internal users and resources. In order to prevent 
this, an access list is configured on the router to filter traffic and deny any traffic 
originating from non-routable IP addresses. Abderrahim [57] in his research termed this 
technique as network ingress filtering. Examples of IP addresses to be blocked are 
1 0 .0 .0 .0/8, 1 72 . 1 6 .0 .0/ 1 2, 1 92 . 1 68 .0 .0l l  6 ,  1 27 .0 .0 .0/8 , 1 69 .254 .0 .0l l  6,224 .0 .0 .0/4 [ 5 8]. All 
of these non-routable addresses are blocked by access list configuration on the router. 
3.3 The Firewall/IDS 
The Firewall/IDS in the design is a Palo Alto PA-200 device. The PA-200 has the 
capability to perform the function of both traffic filtering and an IDS .  It has the ability to 
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filter URL and block malicious websites. In addition, it comes with antivirus 
functionality that detects viruses and spyware. In order for this P A-200 to fulfill its 
purpose in this research work, the following configurations were set on it: 
3.3.1 Zones and Interfaces configuration 
There are three different zones configured on the Palo Alto . The security needs of the 
firewall/IDS design led to the creation of the three zones. The Ethernet interface 0/ 1 
(E0/ 1 )  was configured as the untrusted zone because it connects to the boundary router, 
the Ethernet interface 0/3 (E0/3) as the DMZ zone and the Ethernet interface 0/2 (E0/2) 
as the trusted zone. The idea behind this network segmentation is to separate the 
webserver and place it on a DMZ to ensure that no traffic from Internet crosses that zone 
to the trusted zone. Figure 3 .4 shows zone configuration while Figure 3 .5 & Figure 3 .6 
show interface configuration. E0/3 is configured with an IP address in the subnet 
1 72 . 1 6 .0 .0/24, the E0/2 is configured with an IP address in the subnet 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 .0/24 and 
E0/ 1 is configured with an IP address in the subnet 50 .0 .0 .0/30 .  The following steps show 
how to configure both zones and interfaces : 
1 .  On the Palo Alto administration interface, click on the Network tab 
2 .  Click on  the zone on  the left side panel 
3 .  Click the add button to create a zone 
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Figure 3 .4 :  Shows zone creation 
4.  Give it a name, then select type as layer3 , then click ok 
5 .  Then click on  interfaces right above zones on  the left side panel 
6 .  Click on the interface to be configured 
7 .  Select the specific security zone you want this interface to be associated with 
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Interface � ame etf. e"n e::. 2 
interface Type Layer3 
I etflow Profi l e  t one 
� Con fig 
Assign Interface To 
Virtual Router 
Security Zone Trusted-int 
Figure 3 . 5 :  Showing interface configuration 
8 .  Click on IPv4 
9 .  Click on add to configure the IP address for this interface 
Interface t ame eue .ret. :c 
Interface Type Layer3 
t etflow Profile r«me 
Comment Trusted lnterface to inside DMZ to !PS 
� · - <·-:� 
Type (!; Static Q PPPoE Q OHCP Client 
lP 
El 10.1 28.1. 1(24 
Figure 3 .6 :  Showing IP address configuration on the interface 
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1 0 . Then click ok 
Repeat the steps above to create the other two zones and interfaces. 
3.3.2 Virtual Router Configuration 
The IDS needs to understand how to route traffic that is coming from both DMZ and 
from trusted zone to untrusted zone. The virtual router implements three static routes :  
The first route routes traffic to any destination on  the Internet using the router's 
GOi l interface IP address as the default gateway 
The second, routes traffic to the 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 .0  network that is in between the IPS 
and the internal router by using the IPS outside interface G0/1 IP address as the 
default gateway) 
And the third one routes traffic to the 1 92 . 1 68 .4 .0 network using the IPS outside 
interface G0/ 1 IP address as the default gateway. 
Figure 3 .7 below shows the first route configuration. The Virtual router configuration 
steps are shown below: 
1 .  Click on virtual routers 
2 .  Click on  add and give i t  any name you want it called as shown below 
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Figure 3 .7 :  Showing virtual router configuration 
3 .  Click on static routes 
4 .  Name your static route and enter the static route details as  shown below 
5. Then click ok 
Virb.lal Router -SJ:attc Route- G) 
Na me route_to_i nternet 
Desti nation 0 .0 . 0 . 0/0 
Interface ethernetl/l 
Next Hop 
Admi n Di !f.ta n ce 1 
+ 4dd 
Me'tric  1 0  
N o  Insta ll  
0 Di<;ca rd 0 None 
Figure 3 . 8 :  Shows how to set static route on a virtual router 
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Repeat all the steps above to create the other two static routes 
The virtual router created has to be attached to the interfaces created. Click on the 
interfaces tab to select the virtual router created as shown in Figure 3 .9 
lnterface Name �i. e-ni�t1 2 
Interface Type Layer3 
Netflo-w Profile None 
Comment Trusted foterface to .ins ide DMZ to JPS 
V•rtual Router IT VR L
<>:::.,n lnt<'rfaoo' T<> 
S.ecunty Zo1\e Tr:sl'ed-lnt -
- ----- - - - - - ---�� ----- - - - - - - - -- --- ---------------- - --
Figure 3 .9 :  Shows how to attach an interface to a virtual router 
3.3.3 NAT Configuration 
A bidirectional NAT is configured to translate the webserver IP address 1 72 . 1 68 . 1 .2 to 
the IP address 50 .0 .0 .2  on the untrusted zone of the IDS when traffic is originating or 
returning from the webserver, and also to translate 50 .0 .0 .2  to 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 .2 when traffic is 
destined to the webserver. The implication of this is that traffic directed towards the IP 
address 50 .0 .0 .2  will translate to the 1 72 . 1 68 . 1 .2 IP address. This is the point at which 
Internet traffic destined for the webserver that is port-forwarded to 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .2 ,  and then 
changed to 50 .0 .0 .2 ,  will translate to 1 72 . 1 68 . 1 .2 .  In addition, the NAT is configured to 
translate the IP address on the trusted zone to the untrusted zone so that traffic coming 
from the inside network outbound the trusted zone can find their path to either the 
webserver or the Internet depending on the traffic destination. 
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3.3.4 Firewall Security Policies 
In this research, several security policies were configured to allow or deny traffic flowing 
from one zone to the other. The rules are shown below: 
1 .  Allow traffic flow from the trusted zone to the untrusted zones 
2 .  Deny traffic from the untrusted zone to  the trusted zone 
3 .  Allow traffic flow from the Internet inbound interface GO/O of the router to the 
untrusted zone and then to the webserver via the DMZ. The policy is named UnT­
DMZ 
4 .  Allow traffic from the DMZ to the untrusted zone 
5 .  Allow traffic flow from trusted to trusted zones 
6 .  Allow traffic flow from the trusted zone to DMZ 
The essence of the security rules above is to deny unwanted traffic from one zone to the 
other and to allow legitimate traffic from one zone to the other. 
The steps below show the creation of the third policy UnT-DMZ 
1 .  Click on the policy tab 
2 .  Click on  the add button to create a policy 
3 .  Under the general tab,  name the policy 
4 .  Click on the source, then click on the add to button under zone to add the source 
zone as untrusted 
5 .  Click on user tab to add user, but this has been set to any in this configuration 
6 .  Click on  destination, then click on  the add button under the destination zone as 
DMZ 
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7 .  Click on the application tab to specify an application, i t  has been configured to 
"any" in this configuration 
8 .  Click on service/URL category, check any button under category 
9 .  Click on the action tab and choose allow 
1 0 . Then click ok. 
Following all the steps above created all the rules as shown in Figure 3 .  1 0  below 
Type Zont Address User . . Zooe Add1us Jl.pplicabon Sier.ii ct Profile 
t»J "Tiusted--ir:: .any �l'I'; any � Untrusted-bt '"' ,3r\j ariy 
tmlve:r;,.:il � Urrtr;;:.1�fxt 1l!'W ;rny i;.F,{ � Tni-.ted-!rrt S;: Uritrn&::�_E-xt .  an; il}W 
i..niverMJ f)� lir'tfLL'.11"(l·fr <lJ'i) ;my (ill'{ Pl; Trus.terl-irrt Cilf( !!'1' irn, 
1;mv:enal ftt Llt!t:'t.<s.te<i·-bt iUlj irt\} l!11'( � DMZ SI !>uill<e wetser a:w art{ 
um� r;z l bll}i'.-'.t; ; .,,, MY (lt DMZ lilt •"Y 1>1l'( 
l.ir}l��j � ,.., i!'!i ili'tf i'!t'I)' ft(, Untn.t•;t<'C'..f:l<'! i'!!1y i1my 3fff 
• ('wFromPoblo!nt IJ.O{';t L!'lr�rtal ft'J! Trw.rt�!nt atiy d !'lJ �nv f}l; Trusted-Jnt on y a � i?l'1'J 
r�t -To--fatD"2 none U!'1iVffSi l � 'Tr ill.id-l'<t G'lf J!l)" any � DMZ (lf!Y 311)' any 
Figure 3 . 1 0 : Shows the configured security policies 
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The steps above describe a policy that controls inbound traffic on the untrusted zone from 
the Internet entering the DMZ to access the webserver. 
3.3.5 Profile Configuration 
Profile configuration is where the IDS configuration is set to detect vulnerabilities, 
spyware, and viruses. In order for this configuration to be effective, the profile 
configuration has to be attached to a particular security rule. The profile created in this 
research is assigned to the UnT-DMZ security policy rule to monitor any traffic going 
through the untrusted zone in order to detect malicious traffic or vulnerabilities. Figure 
3 . 1 1 below shows the profile configuration. 
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Na n e I Security Profi l e! 
Antivi ru� Profi l e  d efa u lt  
Anti-5pyware Profi l e defau lt 
Vu l nerabi l ity Protecti on Profi l e  d efau lt 
URL Fi lteri ng Profile d efau lt-1 
Fi l e  Bl acki ng Profile r one 
Data Fi lteri ng Profil e one· 
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Figure 3 . 1 1 :  Showing profile configuration 
3.3.6 DoS Protection 
The IDS also is configured to mitigate denial of service attack. The detailed configuration 
is shown in Figure 3 . 1 2 .  The steps below show the configuration 
1 .  Click on the objects tab 
2 .  Click on  DoS protection 
3 .  Click on add 
4 .  Give the DoS protection profile a name 
5 .  Check the aggregate button 
6 .  Under flood protection, check all of the buttons under SYN flood, UDP flood, 
ICMP flood and other IP flood tabs 
7 .  Click on resource protection tab, and check the session button 
8 .  Then click ok 
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Description 
Type r. ' Aggreg ate Q Cl ass if ied 
Flood Protection 
SYN Fkmd 
�I SYN Flood 
Acti on R a ndon Ea rly Drop 
Al a rm Rate {1>acket5/� ) 1 0 0 0 0  
Activate Rate (packet!;/�) 1 0 0 0 0  
Max Rate (packets./�) 40 0 0 0  
Bh>ek Durati on {s. ) 3 0 0  
- -
- - - -
Figure 3 . 1 2 :  Showing DoS protection configuration 
3.3. 7 URL Filtering 
URL filtering configured on the IDS blocks traffic from going to some websites that 
contain security risks. In addition, it helps to control the way users inside the network 
consumes network bandwidth. Websites like games websites are high bandwidth 
consumers and surfing these websites might make service unavailable to other users due 
to their high bandwidth usage. In addition, URL filtering would also prevent users from 
visiting websites with viruses and thus prevent ignorant virus downloads. The URL 
filtering configuration below blocks the games URL category. 
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Figure 3 . 1 3 :  Showing URL filtering 
[I eaucationaH n>titutions 
[I entertainment-ami-art, 
[I finandal smkes 
[I gambl ing 
� games 
[I government 
[I hacking 
[I health-and-medi cine 
[I hvme-and-garaen 
J"rl \.., ;  ...... ... ,., ... ,,.f( fi,.. h i  .. ,., " a.iete.s .:: G.Stom Uf;.;.. <.a�1 
C!red l'RL Category 
Steps to configure URL filtering to block games URL category 
1 .  Click on objects 
2 .  Click on  URL filtering 
3 .  Click on add 
4 .  Give i t  a name 
5 .  Select block under action 
6 .  Select game under URL category and then select block action 
7. Then click ok 
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3.4 Webserver Configuration 
The webserver used in this design is a windows server 20 1 2  R2 . The robustness and high 
speed of the Windows Server 20 1 2  R2 make it a good fit for this purpose. The system 
hosting this Windows Server is a core i7 Intel processor, with 8GB RAM and 1 TB hard 
disk size machine. This system hosts the public webserver with the IP address 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 .2 
255 .25 5 .255 .0 .  The content of this server loads whenever a request comes to the public 
webserver IP address. The web application (Damn Vulnerable Web Application) needed 
for the testing of the designed system runs well on Kali Linus Operating System. In order 
to achieve this, the Windows Server is virtualized using the Hyper-V functionality tool 
that comes with Windows Server 20 1 2  R2, and Kali Linus operating system was installed 
on the virtualized server. 
3.5 Firewall/IPS 
The Firewall/JPS is a Cisco 5 5 1 2-x device. This Cisco 5 5 1 2-x device has an IPS sensor 
that comes with over 6000 signatures in its database. The IPS is capable of full network 
participation for global protection. Global protection is a service that allows the IPS to 
synchronize with the cloud in order to compare traffic signatures not just against its own 
database but also against signatures in the cloud. The advantage of this is that Cisco 
collects information about attacks that are detected on any of their IPSs and send it to the 
cloud in order for other IPSs to be aware of these threats. The IPS is configured in an 
inline mode in order to see through every traffic are that traversing the network. 
Configuration instructions are set on the IPS to allow traffic flow from the inside of the 
network and block traffic from coming in from the outside. 
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3.5.1 Interface Configuration of the Firewall/IPS 
Three interfaces are configured on the firewall/JPS in order to segment traffic flow. The 
interface that connects directly to the IDS is EO/O and has been configured as outside with 
security level of 0, this implies that whatever traffic coming from this interface should 
not be trusted. The interface E0/ 1 is configured as a DMZ with security level 50 .  The 
DMZ here host an intranet webserver and two honeypots . This aspect is outside the scope 
of this research but is included in the topology to make it obvious as a future 
recommendation. The intranet web server is meant to be a decoy if peradventure an 
attacker is able to bypass the IDS and get to the IPS ,  the idea is to direct the attacker into 
this webserver to make the attacker feel he is already on the inside network. While the 
attacker does his/her hacking, the honeypots records and captures the details of the 
attacker's activities. E0/2 is configured with the security level of 1 00 since it is the 
interface that connects to the internal router. 
3.5.2 Firewall Security Policies 
Similar to policies on the IDS, policies are set on the IPS too in order to allow or deny 
traffic. The IPS has the following policies configuration: 
1 .  Allow traffic from the inside network to go out to the Internet 
2 .  Allow traffic from the DMZ to go out to the Internet 
3 .  Deny traffic from the DMZ from going to the inside network 
4.  Deny traffic from the outside from going to the inside 
Any other traffic that does not match the allow policies would be denied. The detailed 
configuration of this configuration is shown in the CLI commands in appendix B .  
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3.5.3 EIGRP Routing 
EIGRP routing is configured on the firewall in order for it to advertise the networks on its 
interfaces . This is to enable communication between the firewall and the internal router. 
The good thing about this is that EIGRP protocol is not configured on the IDS and as 
such it does not get any advertisement or routing updates from the firewall/IPS .  
3.5.4 IPS Sensor Configuration 
Configuration for the IPS sensor could be through either the command line interface or 
the Cisco ASDM graphical user interface. The IPS sensor in the design is configured 
using the ASDM graphical user interface. Configuration details for the IPS sensor are on 
the appendix E page. As earlier mentioned, the IPS has over 6000 signatures that it uses 
to detect and prevent different attacks. In addition, it does anomaly detection as well .  In 
this work, about 1 000 signatures are enabled for testing. 
3.6 Internal Router 
The internal router is also a Cisco 1 94 1  W router just like the external router. The internal 
router serves as the gateway between the internal users and the outside network. In the 
design, a 24-port Cisco 1 900 switch connects to the GO/O of the internal router. The 
internal webserver hosting different resources and applications connects to a port on the 
switch. The internal router has EIGRP enabled on it to advertise its route. In addition, a 
static route is set on it to allow the internal network reach every network segment. The 
detailed configuration of the internal is on the appendix B page. 
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3.  7 Internal Webserver 
The internal webserver is also a virtualized version of windows server 20 1 2  R2 just like 
the public webserver while the physical machine itself serves the purpose of a host. The 
Hyper-V functionality tool helps to achieve this as well .  <?n this internal webserver, an 
active directory was setup, so also a domain controller, users in the inside network were 
added to the domain. This is to enable proper monitoring of internal users for auditing 
purpose. The idea behind this is to be able to identify who is accessing what resources on 
the network. 
3.8 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Agentless User-ID 
LDAP on the IDS synchronizes with the Active Directory Server in the internal network. 
It provides the following functions : 
1 .  It allows any authorized user within the domain to authenticate into the IDS in 
other to manage it. This means that an administrator does not need to give out 
his/her password to anyone. 
2 .  The LDAP enables the IDS to perform user identity mapping by configuring 
agentless identity mapping. The LDAP records users IP addresses as well as their 
profile, which include their name and the domain they belong to when they 
generate traffic on the network. This offers an advantage in the event of incidence 
analysis if an inside user has been collaborating with an external attacker. Figure 
3 . 1 4  below shows how LDAP configuration is accomplished 
4 1  
llame Test 
D Admin istrator Use Only 
Servers Name 
LDf\P 
LDAP Server J Port 
192.168.4.1 :1  385 
Figure 3 . 1 4 :  Shows LDAP configuration 
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The steps to configure LDAP is shown below 
1 .  Click on device tab 
Domain mythes is.org 
Type active-di rectory 
Base DC =MYTHESIS,DC = org 
Bind ON testuser2 
Bind Pas.sword ....... , 
Confi rm 84nd .... ,.... 
Password 
U SSL 
Time Limit 3 0  
Bind Time  Limit 30  
Retr)' Interval f 1 3ooJ� -·'---- -
2 .  Under server profile in  the left plane, click on  LDAP 
3 .  Click on add to add LDAP 
4. Under servers click on add 
5 .  Enter the IP address o f  the active directory server and use 3 89 for port number 
6 .  Enter the domain name for your active directory and it  will automatically populate 
the Base field 
7 .  Enter your domain usemame and password 
8 .  Then click ok 
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Steps to Configure Agentless User-ID 
The Agentless User-ID is configured to monitor user session information from the active 
directory server. Steps to configure agentless user-id is shown below 
1 .  Create service account in active directory. Add a user in the active directory to 
the Distributed COM users, Server Operators, and Event Log Readers Groups.  
Right click on the user as shown in Figure 3 . 1 5  below, select properties, then 
click member of, and use the add button to add the user to the groups 
mentioned above 
test user2 Properties I ? � x 
Active Directory Users and Computers 
R!e. Action View Help Remo!e corool I Remote Desldop SeMces Prnfle I COM• j 
.. .  !i [i]  �· CJ 
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General I A:mss I � . 
.L. ..� 
.. 
___ J_T_ elephone$ I Oigarviaoon 1 I 
Member Of Diai"'! __ J_ -·-�vtonmert I s....ons 
� � w Sav•d Qu•rie lil ( loneable 0 ... 
, � MYTHESIS.org � D•ni•d ROD ... 
� � 6Utlt1n 
I 
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.......; Computer3 
I 
i!, DnsUpdateP ... 
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� 2::, ForeignS"urityPrincipal] Jl! Doniain Co ... 
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I 
� Oomam. Gue ... 
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I JI!. Ent.rpn<e A ... f 1 � E nterprise R. .. 
1 1  � GA Student 
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Security Group . . . 
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Sec.urity Group ... 
Security Group ... 
Security Group . .. 
Security Group ... 
Security Group ... 
Security Group ... 
St!:curity Group ... 
Security Group ... 
User 
Security Group . . .  
User 
User 
Security Group ... 
Security Group ... 
Security Group ... 
Security Group . ., 
Oesc ription 
Members of this group t ... 
Members in this group c ... 
ONS Administrators Gro ... 
DNS cl rents who are per. .. 
Designated administreto ... 
All workstations and ser ... 
All dom.11in controllers i ... 
All dom.11in guests 
All domain users 
D�ign.11ted administrate . ., 
Members of this group ... 
Membe:rs in this group c ... 
Built-in ciccount for gue ... 
Members of this group ... 
1 1  
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• ,{ · ·  ···••* •. . : 
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Figure 3 . 1 5 :  Shows how to add users to service accounts 
The IDS uses WMI authentication and the user has to modify the security settings on 
CIMV2 security properties on the active directory server. Open the WMI by running 
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wmimgmt.msc on windows command prompt, then right click on WMI control as shown 
in Figure. 3 . 1 6  below and then select properties. 
wmimgmt - (Console Root\WMI Control (Local)J 
i  File Action View Favontes Window Help 
D Con1ole Root 
� WM! Corytttll l A . . . . � ··�-·�]ement Instrumentation (WMI) Connect to another computer ... 
View 
New Window from Here 
New T askpad 'liew ... 
Properties 
Help 
' :he Window1 Management Instrumentation (WM!) 
Figure 3 . 1 6 : Shows WMI configuration 
Actions 
WM! Control {local) 
More Actions 
Then select the security tab and click on the root to expand it. Select the folder CIMV2, 
click the security tab and add the service account from step 1 ,  and ensure you click 
enable account and remote enable as shown in Figure 3 . 1 7  below 
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Figure 3 . 1 7 : Shows how to add CIMV2 security to service account 
2 .  Go to  the IDS (Palo Alto) and click on  the device tab, then select user 
mapping as shown in Figure 3 . 1 8  below, and then click the add button to enter 
a name for the server and enter the IP address for the active directory server. 
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Figure 3 . 1 8 :  Shows user-mapping configuration 
If the above configuration is correct, you will see the server connected as shown below in 
Figure 3 . 1 9 . 
Enabled Type Network Address 
Microsoft Act:ive Dl'red:etry ----
Figure 3 . 1 9 : Shows successful connection of active directory to LDAP 
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Sta tu; 
Connected 
3 .  Then attach this user mapping to the trusted zone on the IDS as shown in 
Figure 3 .20 below. Click on network tab, then click on the zone and select the 
zone as shown below, and check the button "enable user identification" .  Then 
click ok. Doing this will always capture every internal user that sends traffic 
out through the trusted zone. 
Name · Trusted-Intl 
LDq Settinq Ntine 
- - ; 
Figure 3 .20 :  Shows enable user identification 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 Results and Discussion, Conclusion & Recommendation 
This research has accomplished the design for the IDS/IPS laboratory for the MSc Cyber 
Security program at EIU. The design was tested and worked as expected. All of the 
various network segments were able to communicate with themselves as expected. The 
laboratory design has its own network connection to the Verizon ISP, thereby isolating it 
from constituting a risk to the EIU network or any other public network. The internal 
users in the laboratory design are able to access the Internet with their own private IP 
addresses . 
4.1  Results and Discussion 
A major breakthrough of this design is that it was able to go online so it can serve the 
purpose of a public testing platform where hackers can launch different forms of attacks. 
This is very significant and it is a milestone. Students would have the privilege of 
working with real cyber-attacks and laboratory simulated attacks rather than only 
laboratory simulated attacks. 
Figure 4 . 1 below shows an internal user with the IP address 1 92 . 1 68 .4 . 1 00 pinging 
www.google.com. This is a proof that the internal users can access the external network. 
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Figure 4 . 1 :  Shows an internal user sending ping packets to google 
However, users are restricted from accessing certain websites by configuring URL 
filtering. Figure 4.2 shows a user blocked when he/she tries to visit a questionable 
website. 
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>< 
Web Page Blocked 
Access to the web page you were trying to visit has been blocked in  accordance with company 
policy. Please contact your system administrator if you believe this is in error. 
User: mythesis\koluwaseun 
URL :  lrt7a.coldcertainchannel.com/?KW=addicitnggames.com 
category: questionable 
Figure 4 .2 :  showing an internal user blocked from accessing forbidden website 
An interesting part of this is that the agentless user-id mapping functionality would map 
such a user's ID and domain to that traffic so that appropriate actions is taken against 
such a user. Figure. 4 .3  show how the IDS capture the details of the internal user trying to 
access a questionable website. 
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Figure 4 .3 : Showing details of an internal user captured by the IDS 
so 
This is very significant in conducting incidence analysis in the event of a break in. The 
administrator can see which user originates what traffic and what website or IP addresses 
the internal user is sending traffic to . The ACC tab presents a better view of this 
visibility. The administrator is able to see what users are doing, what applications are 
consuming network bandwidth, and what threats are traversing the network, etc . Figure 
4.4 shows how the ACC represents activities on the IDS .  
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Figure 4 .4 :  Shows ACC tab with web browsing activities details 
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In addition, the internal users are able to access the public webserver, which is resident 
on the DMZ segment of the IDS .  This offers good security because the internal users do 
not need to go outside of the network or use the public IP address of the public 
webserver. The Figure 4 .5  below shows a user accessing the public webserver using the 
private IP address of the webserver 
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Welcome to Dam n  Vulnerable Web Application!  
Damn Vulnerable Web Apphcation {DVWA1 i s  a PHP/MvSOL web application thal is damn vulnerable Its main 
goal is 1 0  be an aid for security prnfessiona!s lo test their skills. and tools in a legal environment help web 
developers b€tte-r understand the processes of securing web applications and to aid both studems & 1eachers 10 
lea:rn abou1 web application secUJity in a comroHed class room environment 
The aim of OVWA is 10 practice some of the mos1 common web vuloer<"bllhy with vnrious difficultly 
levels vAth a simple stn:iiqhtrorward irrterlace 
General Instructions 
lt Is up to the user haN they apprc.ach OVVVA Either by \'JOJking 1hfough every module at a fixed �vel or 
se!ec:1in9 any module and '1-X)rking up to reach lflE. highest level they can before moving onto the neJtt one ThE>re 
i.o: not a fixed obje<:t to complete a module however users should feel 1hat they nave successfully eltplcited lhe 
system as best as they possible CQUJd by using that particular vulnerability 
Please note, there are bo1h documented nnd undocumente<i vulnerability with this soft..-.'<lre This is 
intentional You 0tre €ncouraged to try itnd dl�cover as numy issues as possible 
OWIA also includes a Web Applicalion Firewall (WAf} PMPIOS whi<.:h can be enabled at iiny s:age to further 
incr&ase the difficult) This will demonstrate how adding anoth€r layer of security may block cenain maliciou£ 
act!Oll!; Note there are also various pubtk mefhods at bypassing these protections (so this can be see an as 
extension for more <11dvance users� 
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There are (!\so acWiliona! links for further background reading which relates to lhal secu1ity issue 
Figure 4 . 5 :  Internal access to webserver using the webserver' s  private IP address 
In order to test the functionality of the IDS/IPS developed, a vulnerable web application 
is hosted on the webserver. The result shows that SQL inj ection attacks were launched 
against the webserver frequently, and this was detected by the IDS as shown in Figure 4 .6 
below. In Figure 4 .6 below, it  can be observed that the victim' s  IP address isn't  shown as 
the webserver IP address but rather as the IP of the untrusted zone on the IDS .  This is a 
very good security feature because the webserver is being protected. 
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Figure 4 .6 :  Shows IDS capturing SQL Inj ection attacks 
In another instance as shown in Figure. 4 .7  below, the IDS detected a spyware 
JBoss. Worm Command and Control. According to Amazon Web Service, the 
JBoss.Worm Command and Control is a worm that runs on an infected host that scans 
other network and connects to unprotected JMX console in order to execute some codes 
on the victim [59] . The IDS identified this attack as critical and performed reset-both 
actions on it. An action that resets the connection if it is TCP based and drop the 
connection if it is UDP based. Because of this, a configuration is set on the IDS to block 
any such malicious traffic. 
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Figure 4 .7 :  Shows a detected spyware 
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The IDS/IPS design proved to be secure because there is no traffic able to breakthrough 
from Internet into the IPS,  which directly connects behind the IDS .  However, the IPS 
monitors all traffic leaving the internal network and prevents any suspicious response to 
traffic initiated from the inside. Figure. 4 .8  shows a closed UDP session from an IP 
address 94.245 . 1 2 1 .254 going to 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 .2,  which is a webserver on the DMZ interface 
of the IPS .  
l 6 Apr 20 2016 21:07: 32 3020 15 !92. 168 .4. 10 55704 
6 Apr 20 20 16 2 1 :07: 29 3020 16 8.8.4 .4 53 
6 Apr 20 2016 2 1:07: 29 3020 16 8.8.8 .8 53 
i 6 Apr 20 2016 21:07: 26 3020 16 94. 245. 121.254 3544 
l 6 Apr 20 2016 21 :07: 26 302014 10. 128. l. l  39059 
Figure 4 . 8 :  Shows a closed UDP session 
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4.2 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this research is to research and propose an initial solution for the 
new Master of Science program in Cyber Security at EIU. This research fulfills this 
purpose. In addition, the research also fulfills all the set objectives set at the beginning. 
The design developed would afford student to learn real cyber-attacks detection and 
prevention techniques to complement Cyber Security theoretical knowledge. In addition, 
the public testing site would also allow students to learn both within and outside of the 
classroom. Furthermore, the public testing site would invite hackers and it is expected 
that new and sophisticated attacks might be detected and student can carry out further 
research on these attacks . 
4.3 Recommendation 
This design is subj ected to the man in the middle attack by using IP spoofing techniques 
to poison the router's interface that connects to the internal switch. The result shows that 
the design could not stop this form of attack. Figure 4 .9  below shows how an attacker 
was able to sniff FTP login details. 
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Figure 4 .9 :  Showing internal attacker capturing FTP credentials 
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Because of this, the recommendation for further research is to improve this design to 
detect and prevent internal attacks. In addition, a honeypot should be implemented on 
both the external DMZ and the internal network in order to have a repository that store 
attackers ' activities for the purpose of thorough incidence analysis. Furthermore, 
subsequent research can focus on creating a VPN access for remote site users needing to 
communicate with the internal network from the outside over a public network. 
In summary, it is my recommendation that the Firewall laboratory set up with IPS/IDS 
can be enhanced with additional research activities like: 
The design of an internal watchdog (IDS/IPS) to protect internal users or intruders 
from penetrating the systems in spite of the current protections. 
VPN access to at least the DMZ and Internal Zones to study the risk involved in 
this kind of activities as many companies allow some authorized employees to 
access internal servers. 
To launch a systematic attack (internal auditing) on the system by our own people 
to explore all the avenues or possible holes we have not identified yet. 
The hardening of the Windows servers to protect them if an intruder is able to 
reach them. 
The hardening of the switches to protect from internal attackers. 
Further research/implementation is necessary to ensure a well-protected log 
system that allows us to keep the records of the hacker' s activities (in successful 
attacks) without allowing the hacker to delete the records. 
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Access to the laboratory facilities also should be monitored (logins to the 
machines with additional security i .e biometrics) to ensure only authorized users 
can change our configurations. 
In the academic area, develop laboratory guidelines to set up and monitor 
o The Palo Alto Firewall (IDS) 
o The Cisco Firewall box (IPS) 
o The Windows servers 
o The Architecture as a whole (replication of the system with laboratory 
guidelines) 
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Appendix A 
Definition of Terms 
Firewall : is a network device-hardware, software, or a combination thereof- whose 
purpose is to enforce a security policy across its connections by allowing or denying 
traffic to pass into or out of the network 
Intrusion detection Systems (IDS) :  is a security system that detects inappropriate or 
malicious activity on a computer or network. 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) : An intrusion prevention system monitors network 
traffic for malicious or unwanted behavior and can block, reject, or redirect that traffic in 
real time. 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) : A DMZ sometimes referred to as a perimeter network is a 
physical or logical subnetwork that contains and exposes an organization' s external­
facing services to a larger and untrusted network, usually the Internet. 
Router: A router is a device that forwards data packets along networks 
ARP poisoning: is a type of attack in which a malicious actor sends falsified ARP 
(Address resolution Protocol) messages over a local area network. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) : A VPN is a technology that creates an encrypted 
connection over a less secure network. 
Internet of Things (IoT) : loT refers to the ever-growing network of physical objects that 
feature an IP address for Internet connectivity, and the communication that occurs 
between these objects and other Internet-enabled devices and systems. 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) : NIDS focuses on network traffic-the bits 
and bytes travelling along cables and wires that interconnect the systems. 
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Active Directory: Active Directory is a database that keeps track of all the user accounts 
and passwords in your organization. It allows you to store your user accounts and 
passwords in one protected location, improving your organization's security. 
Domain Controller: a domain controller (DC) is a server that responds to security 
authentication requests (logging in, checking permissions, etc.) within a domain. 
Virtualization: Virtualization refers to the act of creating a virtual (rather than actual) 
version of something, including virtual computer hardware platforms, operating systems, 
storage devices, and computer network resources. 
WMI: Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a set of specifications from 
Microsoft for consolidating the management of devices and applications in a network 
from Windows computing systems. WMI is installed on all computers with Windows 
operating systems. 
CIMV2 : CIMV2 is the default WMI namespace on Windows machines. 
Spamming: This is the use of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited message 
(spam), especially advertising, as well as sending messages repeatedly on the same site. 
Bitcoin Mining: This is the process of transactions in the digital currency system, in 
which the records of current Bitcoin transactions, known as blocks, are added to the 
record of the past transactions, known as the block chain. 
Industrial Espionage: Spying directed toward discovering the secrets of a rival 
manufacturer or other industrial company 
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Appendix B 
Configuration for firewalVIPS 
IPS# sh run 
: Saved 
ASA Version 9. 1 (2) 
hostname IPS 
enable password E.bgA9kfttKB/.vi encrypted 
names 
! 
interface GigabitEthemetO/O 
shutdown 
no nameif 
security-level 0 
no ip address 
interface GigabitEthemet0/1 
nameif outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 1 0. 1 28 . 1 .2 255 .255.255 .0 
interface GigabitEthemet0/2 
nameif DMZ 
security-level 50 
ip address 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 . 1  255 .255 .255 .0  
! 
interface GigabitEthemet0/3 
nameif inside 
security-level 1 00 
ip address 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 . 1  255 .255 .255 .0  
interface GigabitEthemet0/4 
shutdown 
! 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
interface GigabitEthemet0/5 
shutdown 
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! 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
interface ManagementO/O 
speed 1 00 
management-only 
nameif management 
security-level 1 00 
ip address 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 . 1  255 .255 .255 .0  
! 
ftp mode passive 
clock timezone GMT 0 
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface 
object network DMZ_ outside 
subnet 0.0 .0 .0 0.0 .0 .0 
object network web-server-from-outside-thru-palo 
host 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 .2 
object network web-server-fromlnside 
host 1 0. 1 28 . 1 0 .2 
object network IntrnalRouterNetwork 
subnet 1 92. 1 68 . 1 00.0 255 .255 .255 .0  
object network inside-network 
subnet 1 72. 1 6 . 1 0 .0 255.255.255.0 
object network 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 . 1  
host 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 . 1  
object network 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0.2 
host 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0.2 
object network 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 .0 
subnet 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 .0 255.255.255.0 
object network 1 0. 1 28 . 1 .2 
host 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 .2 
object network Nat_inIPSrouterToOutside 
subnet 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 .0 255.255.255.0 
object network IntASA 
subnet 0.0 .0 .0 0.0 .0 .0 
object network officeLanTolnside 
subnet 1 92 . 1 68 .4.0 255.255.255.0 
object network office_ Lan 
subnet 1 92. 1 68 .4.0 255.255.255 .0  
object network Inside _going_ Outside 
subnet 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 .0 255.255.255.0 
description Inside traffic should go out 
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object network Inside _goingTO _ InsideDMZ 
subnet 1 72 . 1 60. 1 0 .0 255 .255.255 .0  
description Inside traffic going to DMZ 
object network Outside_DMZ 
subnet 1 76 . 1 6. 1 .0 255 .255 .255 .0  
description The outside DMZ network 
object network Inside_ Going_ Outside 
subnet 1 72 . 1 6. 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 
description network address btw ASA and internal Router 
object network Inside_ Going_ outside 
subnet 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0  
object network Network_Behind_Internal_Router 
subnet 1 92. 1 68 .4.0 255 .255 .255 .0  
description Network_ Behind_ Internal_ Router 
object network Nat_Inside_To_DMZ 
subnet 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 
access-list inside_access_in extended permit ip any any 
access-list OutsideThruPaloToDMZ extended permit ip any host 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0.2 
access-list OutsideThruPaloToDMZ extended permit ip object 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 . 1  object 
1 72. 1 6 . 1 0.2 
access-list inside_access_out extended permit icmp 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 .0 255.255.255.0 object 
Network_Behind_Internal_Router echo-reply 
access-list inside_access_out extended permit ip any any 
access-list inside_access_in_l extended permit ip 1 72. 1 6. 1 0.0 255 .255 .255 .0 any 
access-list inside_ access_ in_ 1 extended permit ip object 
Network_ Behind _Internal_ Router any 
access-list ALLOW_ OUT_ IN extended permit icmp any any 
access-list ALLOW_ OUT_ IN_ echo extended permit icmp any any echo-reply 
access-list ALLOW _OUT_IN_echo extended permit ip object 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 . 1  any 
access-list DMZ_access_in extended permit ip 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 any 
access-list DMZ_ALLOW _echo_Reply extended permit icmp 1 0. 1 28 . 1 0 .0 255.255.255 .0  
1 72. 1 6. 1 0.0 255.255 .255 .0 echo-reply log 
access-list DMZ_access_in_l extended permit ip any any 
access-list DMZ_access_in_2 extended permit icmp 1 0. 1 28 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 
1 72 . 1 6. 1 0 .0 255.255.255.0 echo-reply 
access-list DMZ_access_in_2 extended permit icmp 1 0. 1 28 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 object 
Network _Behind_ Internal_ Router echo-reply 
access-list DMZ_access_in_2 extended deny ip any object 
Network Behind Internal Router - - -
access-list DMZ_ access _in_ 2 extended deny ip any 1 72. 1 6 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 
access-list DMZ_access_in_2 extended permit ip any any 
pager lines 24 
logging enable 
7 1  
logging asdm informational 
mtu outside 1 500 
mtu DMZ 1 500 
mtu inside 1 500 
mtu management 1 500 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 1 4400 
no arp permit-nonconnected 
! 
object network DMZ_outside 
nat (DMZ,outside) dynamic interface 
object network web-server-from-outside-thru-palo 
nat (DMZ,outside) static interface 
access-group ALLOW_ OUT_ IN_ echo in interface outside 
access-group DMZ_access_in_2 in interface DMZ 
access-group inside_ access _in_ 1 in interface inside 
access-group inside_ access_ out out interface inside 
! 
router eigrp 1 000 
no auto-summary 
network 1 0 .0 .0 .0 255 .0.0 .0 
network 1 72 . 1 6 .0 .0 255.255.0 .0 
route outside 0.0 .0 .0 0.0 .0 .0 1 0. 1 28 . 1 . 1  1 
timeout xlate 3 : 00 :00 
timeout pat-xlate 0 :00 :30  
timeout conn 1 :00 :00 half-closed 0 : 1 0 :00 udp 0 :02 :00 icmp 0 :00 :02 
timeout sunrpc 0 : 1 0 :00 h323 0 :05 :00 h225 1 :00 :00 mgcp 0 :05 :00 mgcp-pat 0 :05 :00 
timeout sip 0 :30 :00 sip_media 0 :02 :00 sip-invite 0 :03 :00 sip-disconnect 0 :02 :00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0 :02 :00 uauth 0 :05 :00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0 :0 1  :00 
timeout floating-conn 0 :00 :00 
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicy 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
http server enable 
http 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 management 
no snmp-server location 
no snmp-server contact 
snmp-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart warmstart 
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite 
crypto ca trustpool policy 
telnet timeout 5 
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ssh timeout 5 
ssh key-exchange group dh-group 1 -shal 
console timeout 0 
dhcpd address 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .2- 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .254 management 
dhcpd enable management 
! 
threat-detection basic-threat 
threat-detection scanning-threat 
threat-detection statistics 
threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept rate-interval 30  burst-rate 400 average-rate 200 
ssl encryption aes 1 28-shal 3des-shal 
class-map inspection_ default 
match default-inspection-traffic 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_ dns _map 
parameters 
message-length maximum client auto 
message-length maximum 5 1 2  
policy-map global_policy 
class inspection_ default 
inspect dns preset_dns_map 
inspect ftp 
inspect h323 h225 
inspect h3 23 ras 
inspect rsh 
inspect rtsp 
inspect esmtp 
inspect sqlnet 
inspect skinny 
inspect sunrpc 
inspect xdmcp 
inspect sip 
inspect netbios 
inspect tftp 
inspect ip-options 
inspect icmp 
inspect icmp error 
class class-default 
ips inline fail-open 
user-statistics accounting 
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service-policy global_policy global 
prompt hostname context 
no call-home reporting anonymous 
Cryptochecksum:060dl 6daal e6364b4b88ace962b9c94e 
: end 
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Appendix C 
Boundary Router Configuration 
Current configuration : 2022 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 03 : 1 8 : 50 UTC Mon Apr 1 8  20 1 6  
! 
version 1 5 . 1  
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname Router 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no aaa new-model 
service-module wlan-ap 0 bootimage autonomous 
! 
no ipv6 cef 
ip source-route 
ip cef 
! 
! 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
crypto pki token default removal timeout 0 
! 
license udi pid CISC01 941W-A/K9 sn FTX1 52583HY 
hw-module ism 0 
! 
! 
Redundancy 
! 
! 
interface GigabitEthernetO/O 
ip address dhcp 
ip nat outside 
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! 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
interface wlan-apO 
description Service module interface to manage the embedded AP 
no ip address 
arp timeout 0 
no mop enabled 
no mop sysid 
! 
interface GigabitEthernetO/l 
! 
ip address 50.0 .0 . 1 255 .255.255.252 
ip nat inside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
interface Wlan-GigabitEthernetO/O 
description Internal switch interface connecting to the embedded AP 
! 
interface Serial0/0/0 
no ip address 
shutdown 
no fair-queue 
clock rate 2000000 
! 
interface Serial0/0/1 
ip address 1 92 . 1 68 .240.2 255 .255 .255 .252 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /0 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 / 1  
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /2 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /3 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /4 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /5 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /6 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 /7 
! 
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interface Vlan 1 
no ip address 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
ip nat inside source list 1 0 1  interface GigabitEthernetO/O overload 
ip nat inside source static tcp 50.0 .0 .2 80 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 .2 80 extendable 
! 
access-list 1 0 1  permit ip any any 
ip access-list extended ingress-antispoof 
deny ip 1 0 .0 .0 .0  0 .255 .255 .255 any 
deny ip 1 72 . 1 6 .0 .0  0 . 1 5 .255 .255  any 
deny ip 1 92 . 1 68 .0 .0  0 .0 .255 .255 any 
deny ip 1 27 .0 .0 .0  0 .255 .255 .255 any 
deny ip 224 .0 .0 .0  3 1 .255 .255 .255  any 
deny ip 1 69 .254 .0 .0 0 .0 .255 .255 any 
control-plane 
! 
! 
! 
line con 0 
line aux 0 
line 67 
no activation-character 
no exec 
transport preferred none 
transport input all 
transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v 1 20 ssh 
line vty 0 4 
login 
transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1 000 
end 
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Appendix D 
Internal Router Configuration 
Current configuration : 2494 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 04 :34 :50 UTC Sat Apr 9 20 1 6  
version 1 5 .2 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname InternalRouter 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
no logging console 
enable secret 5 $ 1 $P 1 7h$Tw9icjdxSyPtslSX3fU53 1 
no aaa new-model 
service-module wlan-ap 0 bootimage autonomous 
! 
ip cef 
! 
ip domain name mythesis.org 
no ipv6 cef 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
license udi pid CISC01 94 1 W-AIK9 sn FTX1 8228352 
hw-module ism 0 
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! 
username cisco secret 5 $ 1 $CW.o$G6yNKhr9Da84rpYnj/HQdO 
ip ssh version 2 
! 
interface Embedded-Service-EngineO/O 
no ip address 
shutdown 
interface GigabitEthernetO/O 
ip address 1 92 . 1 68 .4. 1 255 .255.255 .0  
duplex auto 
speed auto 
interface wlan-apO 
description Service module interface to manage the embedded AP 
no ip address 
arp timeout 0 
no mop enabled 
no mop sysid 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
! 
ip address 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0.2 255 .255 .255 .0 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
interface Wlan-GigabitEthernetO/O 
descripti?n Internal switch interface connecting to the embedded AP 
no ip address 
interface Serial0/0/0 
ip address 1 92 . 1 68 .240. 1 3  255.255 .255 .252 
clock rate 2000000 
interface Serial0/0/1 
ip address 1 92. 1 68 .240. 1 0  255.255.255 .252 
interface Vlan 1 
no ip address 
79 
router eigrp 1 00 
network 1 92. 1 68 .240.0 
router eigrp 1 000 
timers active-time 30  
metric maximum-hops 50  
network 1 72. 1 6 .0 .0 
network 1 92. 1 68 .4.0 
ip forward-protocol nd 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
ip route 0.0 .0 .0 0 .0 .0 .0 1 72 . 1 6. 1 0 . 1  
ip route 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 . 1  
ip route 1 0 . 1 28 . 1 0 .0 255 .255 .255 .0  1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 . 1  
ip route 50.0 .0 .0 255 .255 .255 .252 1 72 . 1 6 . 1 0 . 1  
ip route 1 72. 1 6. 1 .0 255 .255 .255 .0 1 72. 1 6. 1 0. 1 
control-plane 
line con 0 
password cisco 
login 
line aux 0 
line 2 
no activation-character 
no exec 
transport pref erred none 
transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v 1 20 ssh 
stopbits 1 
line 67 
no activation-character 
no exec 
transport preferred none 
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transport input all 
transport output pad telnet rlogin lapb-ta mop udptn v 1 20 ssh 
line vty 0 4 
password cisco 
login local 
transport input all 
scheduler allocate 20000 1 000 
end 
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Appendix E 
Configuration for IPS Sensor 
The following are the steps to configure the IPS sensor 
1 .  Click on IPS and then click on startup wizard 
� S.tuo 
�  !!'ll Noh-.'O<k :/€J Alowed Hosts11>lew01<s 
0 Tme  · !lJJ AuthentGobon 
Interfaces 
Pol<!es 
t!ilil !PS Poioes  
c !il;> Sq\allxe Defnt>ons 
5 �"'1l Ill Am<oSq\o!l.re> 
fl Adw,,ef'..oyware 
fl Atta<!< fl Confl<jur•llOO• 
� OOoS 
fl DoS 
fl Emal � lOS IPS 
fl Instant MesS09')9 
fl l2i\.3,l.4Plotocol 
� Nctwo<I: S<rv1CCs 
� �te·to-Sitf" \'PN 
�ies 
The StoftLl> wiz¥d o=ts yw "' a>nfigumg your Os<o !PS 
'""'°'· u.. ths wizard to perlcrm bas<: sensor confl<jurabon. 
� Starb.4) wizard can be I'll' at MY tme. lf�x�ted ahe' 
s;tNt..lp, it ts ritialtz!d with values from tilt asrent coofigaation, 
Figure E- 1 :  Showing the startup wizard 
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Cisco ASA 55xx 
2 .  Click on  launch startup wizard 
Startup Wizard 
How The Startup Wizard Works ---
Sensor Network Se!iJ;l -
In this step, you can change the basic network set1Jngs, aHo\\'ed hosts/networks entries 
and Network Parhopat:on (7.0 and above) 
Sensor Time Setup 
In this step, you can change the Tmezone, 5'.lnmertime and NTP server settings. 
Traffic AJlocat:on -----------
In this step, you can allocate traffu: from the ASA to be inspected 
by the defatJt vrtual sensor. 
Virtual Sensor Configuration --------------­
In this step, you can assign a dera.Jt block policy to a new or existing vrtual sensor. 
Auto Update -----
ln this step, you can configure Auto Update settings to automaticaly download 
signature and engine updates. 
< Baci. FnsJ-- ' Cancel 1 Help 
'-. - .____. 
Figure E-2 : Showing configuration information 
3 .  Click next, enter the name for the IPS sensor, IP address in the same subnet range 
with the Cisco ASA (firewall) management interface because the IPS sensor 
shares same management interface with it. The default gateway will be the 
management interface IP address 
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I etworksettngs -.-- ----------�------ --- --- • 
Host Name: sensor! 
IP Address: 192. 168. l.2 
SUbnet Mask: 255.255.255.0 " 
Gateway: 192. 168. 1. l 
Http Proxy Server: 
Http Proxy Port: 
DNS Pnmary: S.8.8.8 
owed hostsfnetworl:s that can access the sensor --------
Network 
j 192. 168. !.O 
Mask 
255.255.255.0 
Network Participation - - ----­
@ Off Q Parlial Q Ful 
Add 
- --, �  < Bad< Next > Fmh 
Figure E-3 : Showing host name and IP address configuration 
4 .  Click next to enter date and time information. You should leave the NTP server 
information blank except you have an NTP server 
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Current Sensor Date and Trne ------------------- u 
Date: l"hu, 21 A(); 2016 09:00:07 
Trne Zone --- - - - - - ­
Zone Name: 
NTP Server -
IP Address: 
Key: 
Key ID: 
Summertime 
[ti Aulhenticated tffl' 
Q Enable Summertime Configure Sl.n'.'1'\eftime., 
v Offset: -300 Minutes 
Figure E-4 : Showing the how to set date, time and enter NTP server information 
5 .  Click next to see the default IPS policy that blocks HIGHRISK traffic. 
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!PS Policy Sonlnary: 
I Signature Event 
t=� Interfaces Poley � : 
�""tehannel ___ o�------�-o 
__
_ ,uJe_s_o 
Anomaly 
Detection Description 
Policy 
adO default virtual sen'"..or 
fauft Biod: Policy ----------------- -----­
The fuaowilQ risk category contains the Default 6iod: Policy, v.tich wil be active by default fur the selected virtual 
sensor. 
Select Virtual Sensor: vsO .., 
Solect a Risk Category: · HIG!iRJSK v 
You may cha.'lge the nsk category now or edit the IPS Policies 11 the Pol!cies folder later. 
Figure E-5 : Showing the IPS virtual sensor policy 
6. Click next, to configure the IPS sensor to be in inline mode. As shown in the 
figure below, the rule is set to see traffic from any source going to any 
destination. You can add more rules here to apply to whatever direction of traffic. 
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Poc:Y,,t Flow Diagram for the selected rt.de -
© Click on the st.rt buttro to see the packet tiow arwnation 
�: !Nine 
ACL Check MPC Check 
Cisco ASA 5540 
91 ----- ----"'� 
ASA M.1in Systtm 
ASA·SSM Modult 
� Start II Pause 
Figure E-6 : Showing the traffic allocation 
7 .  Click next, and then check the enable signature and engine updates from 
cisco .com. You can create an account on cisco.com. Then enter the account login 
information as shown below. In addition, you will enter the time when you want 
the daily updates run. It is very important to enter the appropriate information. 
Then click next, it will prompt that you commit the saves, click ok. Then click 
finish. 
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Startup Wizard 
to Update (Step 6 of-) , ' · 
Enable and configure the Auto Update setl!ngS to automabtaly download signature and engine updates and eppl;· them 
to the sensor, 
0 Enable Signature and Engl!'le Updates from C.Sco.com 
Cisro.com Access 
Usemame: aadeyemo l 
Password: • • • • • • • • • • •  
Confirm Pas%«d: • • • • • • • • • • • 
Changes Successfully Committed 
The changes have been successfulv conmtted 
OK 
Note: .............. . . ,,,,.,,_. 
For fu-ther rustomaatioo on the penoctcity or selective daiy updares, go to Auto/Cisco.com Update option under Sensor 
Management. 
--- � 
< Back M!xt > Finish Cancel Help 
Figure E-7:  Configuration to enable signature and engine updates from cisco .com 
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Appendix F 
Figure E-8 : Photo of Firewall Architecture with IDS/IPS 
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